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Abstract
We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by
analyzing and comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders.
We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders,
then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately eÆcient and lead to approximately
the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of
bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All equilibria of the uniform
auction are eÆcient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are ineÆcient.
The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depending
on the specics of the environment.
JEL classication numbers: D44, C72, D41, G14
Key words: auction, competition, discriminatory auction, uniform price auction, Vickrey
auction, eÆciency, fully revealing prices
The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a
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
Matthew O. Jackson Ilan Kremer
1 Introduction
In many markets, including treasury auctions, IPO's, security markets, and internet
based markets, large numbers of agents compete for a limited supply of resources. These
markets use a variety of rules for setting prices including uniform price auctions, pay-
your-bid auctions, and hybrids of these, among others. A fundamental question arises as
to when competitive pressures render the choice of mechanism irrelevant.
A classic view is that with many agents, a set supply of objects (either xed or in per-
capita terms), and some reasonable trading mechanism, an equilibrium of most reasonable
auction formats should approach a competitive equilibrium and so the particulars of the
trading mechanism should be largely irrelevant. In the limit, the agents who value the
objects the most should obtain them, and end up paying a price that is close to the
marginal valuation - that is where the demand and supply curves cross.
1
In this paper we examine and refute this view by comparing the two canonical auction
formats: a uniform price auction where all units are sold at the same price which is some
variation of the highest non-winning bid,
2
and a discriminatory auction where the winning
bids are the prices paid. Our main result is that there are no dierences between auction

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1
An important debate regards the structure of Treasury auctions. For the most part this literature
does not consider the eect of a high degree of competition, which is the main focus of this paper.
For some of the highlights of that literature see Friedman (1960), Chari and Weber (1992), Back and
Zender (1993), Bikhchandani and Huang (1993), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), Hortascu (2001), and
Klemperer (2003).
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There are some variations to consider here, depending on whether agents pay only the highest non-
winning bid among the other agents or among all agents (so one of their own bids might set the price).
All such variations lead to the same consequences from our perspective.
formats if and only if the number of items being sold is negligible compared to the number
of bidders. If the supply is non-negligible then the auction format has implications with
regards to both eÆciency and expected revenues.
To be more specic, we consider the following setting. A seller is interested in selling
some number of identical objects to a number of potential buyers. We examine limits as
the number of buyers (and sometimes the number of objects) becomes large. Each buyer
may be interested in one or perhaps more units. Our interest is in comparing the two
most prominent auction formats: a uniform price auction and a discriminatory auction.
We consider the resulting allocations and the expected revenues the seller obtains. In
both mechanisms the supply is awarded to the highest k bids. The dierence lies in the
way prices are set. This turns out to have important implications for equilibrium bidding
behavior and the eÆciency of the allocation of the goods.
We rst consider situations the supply of objects is xed and thus small relative to
the number of bidders as we let the number of bidders grow. There we nd that:
 If supply is xed then the allocations of all equilibria of either auction format
converge to eÆcient allocations and the seller extracts the full surplus (that is,
the seller's revenue converges to the sum of the winning buyers' valuations). We
illustrate this in Section ?? in example ?? and show it formally in Section ??.
Next, we consider the case where supply of objects grows in proportion to the number
of bidder. There we nd that:
 If the number of units is proportional to the number of bidders then the auction
format matters and impacts both the allocation and the expected revenues.
{ In terms of eÆciency: all equilibria of the uniform price auction converge to ef-
cient allocations; while with multiple-unit demands and decreasing marginal
valuations, all equilibria of the discriminatory auction lead to ineÆcient allo-
cations, even in the limit. We illustrate this in Section ?? in example ?? and
show it formally in Subsection ??.
{ In terms of revenue: the ranking is ambiguous (despite the clear ranking in
terms of eÆciency).
 In the case where agents desire only a single unit (or multiple units at
the same marginal valuation), the auctions can be clearly ranked and
the uniform price auction yields strictly higher limiting revenues than the
discriminatory auction. We illustrate this in Section ?? in example ??
and show it formally in Subsection ??.
 In cases where agents desire more than one unit and have decreasing
marginal valuations for additional units, then the ranking can go either
way and in some cases the discriminatory auction can yield strictly higher
limiting revenues than the uniform price auction. We illustrate this in
Section ?? in example ??.
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Understanding the dierence between a xed supply and a proportional supply of
objects for sale helps develop intuition for our results.
When there is a xed supply of units for sale (that is small relative to the number of
bidders), an agent realizes that when he or she wins an object there are necessarily other
bidders who have very similar information and valuations who are not getting objects.
Regardless of the mechanism, this yields a competitive pressure that pushes bidders to
bid close to their values in order to have any chance of winning, and implies that only the
bidders with the very highest types will get objects. This implies an eÆcient allocation
and results in the full possible revenue going to the seller.
In contrast, when the supply of objects is proportional to the number of bidders,
then even with many bidders { and many of each type - ex post there will be whole
neighborhoods of types who end up getting objects and whole neighborhoods of other
types who do not. Changing a bid now leads to a continuous change in the expectation of
obtaining an object. Even though an individual bidder is negligible in terms of the overall
allocation, each bidder realizes that adjusting their bid provides important tradeos
between the price that he or she pays and the probability of obtaining an object. Here
there is an opportunity for the mechanism to matter, and indeed it does.
With a uniform price auction, agents are essentially price-takers as changing their bid
can have little impact on the price, and so they have incentives to bid their value as that
means that they win under precisely the right circumstances (when the price is below
their value). This leads to eÆcient allocations, even with multiple unit demands.
However, in a discriminatory price auction agents are not price-takers - even in the
limit. Their bids aect their payments and they have an incentive to lower their bids
to lower the price that they pay, and they trade this o against the probability of no
longer winning an object. If each agent desires at most one unit, then under aÆliated
values, agents with higher values have higher expectations about where the marginal bid
will lie, and hence they bid more aggressively. Thus, bids turn out to be monotone in
value and the allocation is eÆcient. However, if agents demand more than one unit and
have decreasing marginal valuations, then it is possible that agents who have the same
value for some object (say the rst object for one bidder and the second for another
bidder) could have very dierent beliefs about the aggregate demand. This breaks the
monotonicity of bidding, as it leads to dierences in expectations that bidders with the
identical value for an object have about the change in probability of winning due to a
change in bids. It is similar to having agents see two separate pieces of information: one
is their own value, and another is information about the aggregate demand. In such a
world with an uncoupling of valuations and information about aggregate demand one
would end up with ineÆcient allocations, and that is what is happening here. While in
our model we have only a single signal per bidder the fact that bidders have downward
sloping demands has a similar eect.
3
3
This is dierent from the ineÆciency noted by Ausubel and Cramton (2002), due to the monopsony
power of large buyers. Such market power is not present in our model due to the large number of bidders.
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The comparison of revenues between the discriminatory and uniform price auctions
with a proportional supply of objects comes down to the incentives that bidders have
to shade their bids on dierent objects. With single-unit demands, bidders shade bids
suÆciently in a discriminatory auction so that there is an unambiguously lower revenue
than in the uniform price auction. However, with multiple-unit demands, agents can
end up bidding aggressively enough on some units that they end up paying more in a
discriminatory auction than in a uniform auction. This depends on the particulars of the
circumstances.
Before turning to the formal presentation of the model we make two further comments.
Since we consider general multi-unit demands, there are some implicit asymmetries in
the auctions we analyze. That is, bids for a rst object of value v can be very dierent
from bids on a second object of value v, because the bidders have dierent information
about which price is likely to clear markets. This is at the heart of the discussion above, is
illustrated in Example ?? below, and is the critical factor in understanding the properties
of and dierences between the auction formats. Unfortunately, this also makes equilibria
a challenge to characterize. Nevertheless, while we cannot always obtain closed forms
for the equilibria, we can still outline the eÆciency properties, and in some cases can
make comparisons of the revenues. In particular, in many cases our approach applies to
all equilibria of these auction formats, including asymmetric equilibria and/or those in
mixed strategies.
It is also important to emphasize that a number of our results do not require any aÆl-
iation of valuations. It is only when we need to examine the equilibria of discriminatory
auctions under a proportional supply of objects that such conditions become important
in deducing equilibrium behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section ?? we illustrate the main
results and intuition through several examples. We formalize and generalize these exam-
ples in the following sections. In Section ?? we describe the model. Section ?? examines
the case of xed total supply, Section ?? examines the case of a proportional supply
(xed per-capita supply) and Section ?? concludes.
1.1 Contributions and Relation to the Literature
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that increasing the number of bidders in an auction
can lead to larger increases in revenue than using an optimal reserve price. This suggests
that in a sense an increase in the number of agents can be more important than particulars
of the auction design. Knowing this, one might be tempted to conjecture (as we initially
did) that with large numbers of agents we do not have to worry about the particulars of
auction design and reasonable auction formats should have the same properties. That is,
The intuition behind the ineÆciency here is closer in spirit to that behind asymmetric auctions as in
Maskin and Riley (2000), where agents with similar values can end up with dierent beliefs. Here it
arises in an initially symmetric world and in large auctions.
4
one might conjecture that the mechanism design is secondary to the number of bidders
in determining the outcome. Our results show while this turns out to be true if the
supply of objects is small relative to the number of bidders, it is not true if the supply is
proportional to the number of bidders.
Kremer (2002) and Bali and Jackson (2002) consider auctions with growing numbers
of bidders and a single unit of a good for sale. Kremer shows that in some common
values settings the expected revenues of rst price, second price and English auctions
all converge to the expected value of the object.
4
Bali and Jackson show that such
convergence holds in a across a wide class of auctions and information settings. The
results in this paper generalize some of the above results to a case of multi-unit demand.
Again, however, a critical insight here is that such equivalency results only hold when
the supply of objects is negligible relative to the population size.
Swinkels (1999, 2001) examines a setting where the supply of objects is proportional
to the number of bidders and bidders may have multi-unit demands. Swinkels (2001)
shows that discriminatory auctions are eÆcient in the limit. This result stands in contrast
to our conclusion that the discriminatory auction can yield allocations that are largely
ineÆcient, even in the limit. The dierence is that he assumes independence across types,
while we allow for correlation in valuations. Under correlation, units that are valued
similarly can have dierent information associated with them which leads to dierent
bidding behavior and ineÆcient allocations.
2 Illustrations of the Main Results
To get a better idea of some of the issues let us consider a few simple examples that pre-
view our central ndings. We keep this discussion heuristic. Nevertheless the reasoning
behind our main results can be seen in these examples. For more detailed arguments see
the theorems and proofs that follow.
Example 1 A Small Number of Objects - EÆcient and Equivalent Auctions
Consider an auction with n bidders. There is a number of objects for sale and to x
ideas let us say that these are tickets for a NBA game. To keep this example simple,
let us suppose that each bidder wants to buy at most two tickets. Bidders vary in how
much they are willing to pay, but there is some correlation among these values. This
might represent some overall measure of fans' excitement or how well the team is doing
and how important the particular game is. In particular, each bidder has a value v
i
for a
rst ticket and a value of
v
i
2
for a second ticket. The valuations v
i
are independently and
identically uniformly distributed between X and some value X+1. Let X be distributed
uniformly on [0,1]. So, while the bidders' valuations are independent conditional on X,
they are correlated when viewed unconditionally.
4
See Goeree and Oerman (1999) for a related result.
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First, let us consider a case where there is some small number of tickets for sale, say
100, and a relatively large number of bidders, say n = 10; 000. With such a number of
bidders, at most one out of a hundred bidders will even obtain a single ticket, much less
two. Moreover, each bidder knows that there are likely to be more than a hundred other
bidders who have a valuation for buying one ticket within 1/100 of their valuation. This
competitive pressure leads bidders to bid nearly their value, and so in both the uniform
or discriminatory auctions the objects are sold to agents who have valuations for the
tickets that are nearly X + 1 (the upper bound on valuations, whatever it turns out to
be) and for prices of nearly X + 1. This is eÆcient and leads to nearly the maximum
possible revenue for the seller.
Example 2 Proportional Numbers of Objects - Contrasts in EÆciency
Next, consider the same information and valuation structure, but a case where the
number of tickets for sale is proportional to the number of bidders. In particular, let
us suppose that the number of tickets for sale is actually the same as the number of
bidders. Remember that each bidder desires two tickets, and so there are still twice as
many tickets demanded as supplied. Things here are a bit more complicated to analyze,
but nonetheless we can still reach some rm conclusions.
First, consider the uniform price auction, which is the easier of the two to analyze.
With a large number of bidders, the chance that any given bidder's bid sets the price
is negligible. Thus, bidders are eectively price takers. This means that bidders have
incentives to bid at or near their valuations. Their bids play a large role in determining
whether or not they get an object, but a negligible role in aecting the price. This
leads to an approximately eÆcient allocation. In this case the market clearing price is
approximately p = X +
1
3
which would be the \competitive price."
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Second, consider the discriminatory price auction. Let us argue that every equilibrium
in a discriminatory auction will be signicantly ineÆcient. Suppose to the contrary that
there was an (approximately) eÆcient equilibrium. Consider a bidder with a valuation of
a rst ticket of v
i
= 4=3, and hence a valuation for a second ticket of 2=3. Such a bidder
knows that X is at least 1/3 and so the eÆcient cuto value is at least 2/3. As other
bidders with values near v
i
= 4=3 have the same information - such a bidder's bid on the
second unit will have to be close to 2/3. Now, consider a bidder with a valuation of a bit
above 2/3 for a rst unit. Such a bidder only knows that X lies somewhere between 0
and his value. Such a bidder assigns non-negligible probability that X could be near 0,
which would lead to a cuto value of p near 1/3. Such a bidder should clearly bid some
signicant amount less than 2/3, as from that bidder's point of view, there is signicant
probability that the market clearing price will be signicantly below 2/3. However, we
have now reached a contradiction of eÆciency: the bidders with v
i
's close to 4=3 are
5
Here, bidders with v
i
's between
X+1+p
2
and X+1 will end up with two units each, and bidders with
v
i
's between p and
X+1+p
2
will end up with only one unit. Given the uniform distributions, the market
clearing condition is then approximately n(2(X + 1  
X+1+p
2
) + (
X+1+p
2
  p)) = n, which leads to a
clearing price of p = X +
1
3
.
6
bidding near their value for their second unit, and will outbid large numbers of bidders
who will end up with v
i
's above 2/3, but who will bid well below 2/3. We conclude
that we get dierent limiting eÆciency properties, with the uniform auction being nearly
eÆcient and the discriminatory auction not.
Example 3 Proportional Numbers of Objects - Contrasts in Revenues I
Let us now compare the revenue generated by the dierent auction formats.
The ineÆcient outcome in Example ?? results from the multiple demands of agents,
which led to an uncoupling of agents' information and their valuations. In the context
of discriminatory auctions, this leads to ineÆciency, while in the context of uniform
auctions it does not; and hence the contrast between the auctions. When we turn to
revenue comparisons, a contrast between the auctions exists whether or not there is such
an uncoupling of agents' information.
Let us rst examine the case with a large number of bidders; but where bidders are
only interested in buying a single object. Let there be fewer objects than bidders to keep
things interesting. Here, there are equilibria of both auctions that lead to approximately
eÆcient outcomes.
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Despite the fact that both auctions now yield the same allocation, they do not lead
to the same revenues. In this case of unitary demands, the uniform price auction yields
strictly higher revenues than the discriminatory auction, even in the limit.
To see this, suppose that there are only half as many tickets as bidders. Let us consider
a slightly dierent information structure that makes some explicit calculations of revenue
a bit easier. Each agent's value for an object is v
i
which is uniformly distributed on [0; X],
and X is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
7
We begin by analyzing the discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction format. The expres-
sion for the limit of the unique symmetric and monotone equilibrium bidding function, b
can be deduced from Milgrom and Weber (1982) (and omitted details from this example
appear in the appendix). It is
b (v
i
) =
(
2v
i
3
if v
i
< :5, and
1
3
if v
i
 :5.
Conditional on X = x, we can then compute expected revenues by computing the average
bid over winning signals. Straightforward calculations lead to a limiting expected revenue
of 0.215 per object.
Let us compare this to the revenue from a uniform price auction. In the unique
symmetric equilibrium players use their dominant strategies of bidding v
i
. This implies
6
This can be deduced from an extension of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
7
See Jackson and Kremer (2003) for a similar example, but with completely common values.
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that the price is the valuation of the agent who has the
n
2
-th highest valuation. The price
in a uniform auction thus converges to
x
2
as n!1. Taking expectations over x; we nd
that in the uniform auction the average revenue per unit converges to 0.25.
Thus, the revenue in large uniform price auctions is approximately 16% more than
that of discriminatory auctions.
8
While this ranking of auctions extends beyond this example to all situations with
single unit demands, the revenue ranking may go either way with multi-unit demands.
The following example provides a case where the discriminatory auction leads to higher
revenue than the uniform auction.
Example 4 Proportional Numbers of Objects - Contrasts in Revenues II
Reconsider the setting Example ?? with the following modications. Agents now
value two objects, with a value for the rst object of K + v
i
and a value for the second
object of v
i
, where K > 1 is dened below. There are 3n=2 objects for sale. So, the
eÆcient allocation is that each bidder gets at least one object, and the n=2 bidders having
the highest v
i
's each get two objects.
The asymptotic expected revenue per object in the Vickrey auction is easy: it con-
verges to X=2 and in expectation is .25.
In the discriminatory auction, the following is the limit of a sequence of equilibria
for large enough K: bidders' rst bid is always 1/3; and the bidders' second bid is as
described in Example ??. Without providing full detail, let us sketch why this is the
limit of a sequence of equilibria. If all the rst bids are above the support of the low bids,
then the second bids are still the limit of a sequence of equilibria since the n bidders end
up bidding for the remaining n=2 items, exactly as in Example ??. So the argument is
that for some large enough K and n, all bidders place their rst bid at the top of the
support of the lower bids. This simply requires that when looking conditional on any
v
i
; there is some minimum (bounded away from zero) of the conditional density of the
cuto bid falling near the top of the support (which must happen in an equilibrium).
This means that even if a bidders sees a low v
i
, that bidder still places some chance on
high X's. Then for large K, lowering a bid by some " below the top of the support of
the expected cuto will lower the payment by " when winning, but loses a value of at
least K with probability " times the marginal probability lost, which is bounded below.
This sequence of equilibria is asymptotically eÆcient
9
and also gives higher revenue
in the limit than the Vickrey (uniform price) auction. The revenue is as follows: in the
8
Also note that both mechanisms fail to extract the full surplus from the bidders even in the limit.
The expected average value of the goods to winning bidders is E[
3X
4
] = :325. This is a more general
phenomenon that is discussed in Jackson and Kremer (2001).
9
The example can be modied to be ineÆcient, and so the ranking of revenues has no general rela-
tionship with asymptotic eÆciency.
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limit 2/3 of the objects are sold at a price of 1/3 and 1/3 of them are sold at a price of
.215; so this is an average price of .294, which is higher than average price in the Vickrey
auction of .25.
This example shows, when combined with Example ??, that one cannot generally
rank the auctions in terms of the asymptotic revenue they generate. Here, the downward
sloping demands introduce large enough additional asymmetries between rst and second
object valuations to result in some interesting behavior and reversal in revenue ranking
from what we saw before.
This example also provides a comment on Example ?? regarding the ineÆciency of
the discriminatory auctions. Here K is large enough so that rst objects are eectively
not competitive with second objects. It is almost as if there are two separate auctions
going on, and this results in eÆcient allocations.
3 The Model
Economies
We examine sequences of economies with increasing numbers of agents. A sequence
of economies is indexed by n, the number of agents in the economy. The agents are
potential buyers of objects in an auction.
A supply of k
n
identical units of a good is to be sold in economy n.
Each agent values up to m  1 units of the good.
We examine the two canonical cases of interest:
10
 If k
n
= k for some k and all n, then we say that there is a xed supply of objects.
 If there exists b 2 (0; m) such that
k
n
n
! b then we say that there is a proportional
supply of objects.
Many standard auction analyses with a single unit for sale, clearly fall into the xed
case, while analyses of auctions such as treasury auctions fall into the proportional case.
Here, in the proportional supply case, we span between the extreme cases where b = 0
which is essentially the xed supply case, and b = m which would be a per-capita supply
that would completely satiate all agents.
Information
10
We chose these two categories to simplify the exposition. A tighter classication is whether or not
the supply per capita converges to zero.
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Information is described by a framework that we borrow from Milgrom (1981), as
described in detail below. This information structure is particularly suited to the dis-
cussion of growing sequences of economies, all based on the same underlying information
structure. We use upper case letters to denote random variables and lower case letters
to denote realizations. We use f to denote a density or conditional density of a random
variable and F to denote a distribution. In some cases when it may be unclear to which
random variables we refer, we use subscripts such as f
X
() ; while when it is clear we will
omit the subscripts.
Each agent i 2 f1; : : : ; ng in economy n observes a private signal S
i
that takes on
values in [0; 1]. There is also an underlying random variable X taking on values in [0; 1].
The S
i
's are independently and identically distributed conditional onX. This conditional
distribution of S
i
given X is described by a density function f (s
i
jx).
11
We assume that
Let S denote the vector of signals S
1
; : : : ; S
n
and let S
 i
denote the vector of signals
omitting S
i
. Let Y (k) denote the k-th order statistic of the signals S and let Y
 i
(k)
denote the k-th order statistic of the signals S
 i
.
We assume that:
(A1) The unconditional (marginal) density of each S
i
, f(s
i
), is positive for all s 2 [0; 1].
For the conditional distribution there exists  > 0 such that f(s
i
jx)  0 implies
that f(s
i
jx)  .
(A1) is a condition that guarantees that in a large enough economy, any agent (re-
gardless of what signal they have observed) expects that there will be many other agents
who will have observed arbitrarily nearby signals. This condition provides for competitive
pressures in the limit.
Preferences
The value of the j-th unit for an agent who has a signal s
i
is given by v
j
(s
i
) : We
assume that
(A2) Agents have private values and desire up to m  1 units. Their non-increasing
marginal utilities for additional units described by fv
j
(s
i
)g
m
j=1
, where v
j
(s
i
) 
v
j
0
(s
i
) for any s
i
and j  j
0
. Each v
j
is dierentiable and increasing in s
i
. We
normalize v
1
(s
i
) to be equal to s
i
.
The utility of an agent i who is awarded J units and pays t
i
is
J
X
j=1
v
j
(s
i
)  t
i
11
The assumption that the random variables have continuous distributions is made to simplify the
exposition, but is not critical to the results.
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Hence, our setup is based on private (but possibly correlated or aÆliated) valuations.
Noisy Participation
In some cases, we follow Swinkels (2001) by considering `noisy participation'. There is
uncertainty regarding the exact number of active bidders in the auction, as is natural in
the context of a large number of bidders. This helps rule out certain types of \degenerate"
equilibria, such as one in a uniform price auction with say 1000 bidders and 500 objects,
where the rst ve hundred bidders each bid the maximum value for a single object and
the other bidders bid 0. This sort of equilibrium involves weakly dominated strategies
by all the bidders, and requires their exact knowledge of the number of active bidders.
If there is uncertainty about the number of bidders, such strategies no longer form an
equilibrium.
12
Formally this is modeled by:
(A3) There is a probability  > 0 that any given bidder is inactive. The inactivity is
independent across bidders and is independent of X:
(A3) can be thought as adding an atom in the distribution of signals at S
i
= 0. Laws
of large numbers imply that in the limit there are approximately (1  )n active bidders.
Auctions
We consider uniform price and discriminatory auctions. In both of these auction
formats each active bidder submits m bids. We denote i's bids by b
i
2 [0; 1]
m
, where
the j-th bid of bidder i is denoted b
ij
. We order bids so that b
ij
is non-increasing in j.
In both auction formats, the k
n
highest bids are each awarded a unit of the good. In
the discriminatory auction bidders pay the sum of their winning bids. So, if bidder i
wins 1  J  m units, then the payment in the discriminatory auction is
P
J
j=1
b
ij
. In
a uniform price auction the winning bidders pay the same price per unit, which is the
k
n
+ 1-st highest bid. So, if bidder i wins 1  J  m units, then the payment in the
uniform auction is Jp, where p is the k
n
+ 1-st highest bid out of all bids.
There are a number of variations on rules for uniform price auctions. Some adjust,
for instance, to make sure that a bidder i's price is not dependent on his own bid. In
one such variation each bidder pays the highest non-winning bid among the other agents.
Our results here are unaected by such details.
Equilibrium
A strategy is a measurable function 
i
: [0; 1] ! ([0; 1]
m
). A strategy is thus a
distribution over submitted bids as a function of i's information.
13
12
One can instead rule out such equilibria via an equilibrium renement that rules out weakly dom-
inated strategies, but with a continuum of actions one has to be careful to work with closures of such
strategies and the technical details for verifying equilibrium conditions can be complicated. Noisy par-
ticipation is an easy and natural condition that provides the necessary renement without any additional
machinery.
13
One can equivalently work with distributional strategies a la Milgrom and Weber (1985).
11
We consider Bayesian equilibria of the auctions.
In some cases we refer to pure strategy equilibria, in which case we write b
ij
(s
i
) to
indicate the j-th bid that i submits as a function of s
i
.
A theorem of Jackson and Swinkels (2001) applies to provide existence of equilibria
here.
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4 A Fixed Number of Units
We begin by analyzing the case where a xed number of units is being sold. Our results
here can be viewed both as a benchmark and as a generalization of results in the previous
literature. Here, there is no asymptotic dierence between the two auction formats, which
in the limit lead to an eÆcient outcome and where the seller extracts the entire surplus.
We say that a sequence of equilibria of an auction leads to approximately eÆcient
allocations, if the average valuations of allocated objects under the specied equilibria
approaches (in probability) the maximizing average of active bidders' valuations across
all possible allocations of the goods.
15
We say that the seller extracts the entire surplus if the seller's revenue approaches (in
probability) the maximizing sum of active bidders' valuations across all possible alloca-
tions of the goods.
Theorem 5 Under a xed supply of objects and assumptions A1-A3, all sequences of
equilibria of discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions lead to approximately
eÆcient allocations. Moreover, in all sequences of equilibria the seller extracts the entire
surplus.
It is important to note that our conclusions hold for the entire equilibrium set and
hence do not depend on the exact form of the equilibrium. That is, we do not rely on
the equilibrium being monotone or even in pure strategies. Our conclusion follows from
the competitive pressure that arises in the limit.
Note also, that this result shows the seller can extract the entire surplus here without
using any reserve price and without much worry as to the choice of auction format.
14
Their theorem handles the uncertain number of bidders through the reservation values. Existence
of pure strategy and monotone equilibria have been established in certain cases, see Athey (2001) and
MacAdams (2000).
15
With a xed number of units for sale, having the average value converge to the eÆcient average
implies that that sum converges to the eÆcient sum. With a proportional number of units, having the
average value converge is weaker than having the sum converge. As we will show a failure of convergence
of the average in some cases, the weaker denition leads to a stronger conclusion.
12
One might be tempted to argue that not only do the uniform and discriminatory
price auction achieve eÆcient allocations and full revenue extraction, but that essentially
any \standard" mechanism would do the same. This however is not true. Consider for
example, a \posted-price" mechanism where a price is xed by the seller and then in the
case of a surplus demand the objects are randomly rationed among buyers who indicate
a desire to buy at the posted price. The allocation will generally be ineÆcient and the
auction yields less than full revenues. Hence, for such a conjecture to hold one needs
to require that the mechanism satisfy some conditions. For instance, any mechanism
that yields an approximately eÆcient allocation will provide the seller with the entire
surplus.
16
Here, it suÆces to have the price that a given bidder pays for a given unit be
at least as high as the highest non-winning bid of the other bidders (or some xed order
statistic of the non-winning bids) and not exceed the winning bidder's bid for the given
unit. For details, see the appendix.
5 A Proportional Supply of Objects
We now examine the case where the supply of objects is proportional to the number of
agents, so that k
n
grows with n. As we shall see the choice of auction format is now
quite relevant. The uniform price auction and the discriminatory auction dier both in
the eÆciency of the resulting allocation and the revenues that the seller can expect. We
begin by showing that while the uniform price auction yields an eÆcient allocation, the
discriminatory auction results in ineÆciency even in the limit.
5.1 Multiple-Unit Demands
Let us rst consider the case where agents desire up to m units of the good (m  1), and
we will return to the special case where each agent demands at most one object (m = 1).
EÆcient Allocations in Uniform Price Auctions
We rst show that a uniform price auction achieves an eÆcient outcome in the limit.
A key intuition behind this fact is that the probability that a bidder's actions can have
a substantial inuence on the price goes to zero in the limit, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6 Consider a setting satisfying A1-A3 and any sequence of equilibria of uniform
price auctions. For any " > 0; there exists a large enough n such that conditional on any
16
Jackson and Kremer (2001) provide results on direct mechanisms under the condition that the
equilibrium allocation result in \concentrated" allocations, where the goods end up in the hands of a
vanishing fraction of the agents, and only those with highest signals. Here we show that this results
from the competitive pressures.
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state X the probability that any bidder i can inuence the price by more than " is smaller
than ".
Lemma ?? is an expression of the fact that a uniform price auction is competitive
in the limit. We use this to show that the price converges to the value of the marginal
buyer and the allocation becomes eÆcient. Let p
n
c
denote this price (the k
n
+1-st highest
valuation in the population) which we term the \competitive" price.
Theorem 7 Consider a setting satisfying A1-A3 and any sequence equilibria of uni-
form price auctions. The equilibrium allocations are asymptotically eÆcient and the
corresponding equilibrium prices converge to the competitive prices in probability; that is,
p
n
  p
n
c
! 0 in probability (where p
n
is the k
n
+ 1-st highest bid).
This theorem tells us that uniform price auctions are \well behaved" when the supply
of objects is proportional, providing eÆcient allocations and competitive prices. We now
turn to the more muddied analysis of discriminatory auctions.
IneÆcient Allocations in Discriminatory Auctions
The analysis of discriminatory auctions is trickier. To get some intuition as to why,
note that in a sense the discriminatory auction is like an asymmetric auction (we discuss
this in more detail below). For instance, with n = m = 2 = k each bidder's high bid
competes with the other bidder's low bid, and vice versa. With a uniform auction, even
with this sort of asymmetry, the incentives are reasonably straightforward as one's bid
is unlikely to aect the price. However, with a discriminatory auction, one's bid always
aects the price paid (if an object is won). This asymmetry means that bids are no
longer monotone in value when compared across bidders. For example a value of 1/2 on
a second unit corresponds to a dierent signal and hence information about the potential
bids of others, than a value of 1/2 on a rst unit. This loss of monotonicity across bidders
is the key reason why the discriminatory auction is ineÆcient (even in the limit).
To gain some intuition behind the result consider two bidders. Bidder I values the
rst unit at 1 and second unit at a 1/2, bidder II values the rst unit at 1/2 and the
second unit at a 1/4. For the allocation to be eÆcient we need that a bid depends only
on values. Specically consider the second bid of bidder I and the rst bid of bidder II.
If these two bids dier then there is potential for ineÆciency. However, this is likely to
be the case as bidders I and II have a dierent posterior regarding the other bidders.
Since there is positive correlation, bidder I expects other bidders to be more aggressive
and hence will bid higher for his second unit.
To simplify the exposition we add several assumptions.
To get some handle on bidding behavior in discriminatory auctions, we work under
the familiar strict monotone likelihood ratio property. To simplify the exposition we also
assume continuity.
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(A4) f(s
i
jx) and f(x) are continuous in x and the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (henceforth, MLRP) holds:
f (s
i
jx)
f (s
0
i
jx)
>
f (s
i
jx
0
)
f (s
0
i
jx
0
)
for all s
i
> s
0
i
and x > x
0
:
Let v
n
denote the eÆcient cuto valuation under a given realization of values, i.e.,
the k
n
-th highest valuation.
Let
min(s
i
) = sup fv j lim
n
Prob (v
n
 vjS
i
= s
i
) = 1g :
So, min(s
i
) is the minimum of the support of v
n
under the limiting distribution condi-
tional on S
i
= s
i
. Note that min(s
i
) will generally be above 0 even if v
n
has full support
for each n, and regardless of s
i
.
The important aspect of this denition is that a bidder seeing s
i
would expect the
lowest value still getting an object in the limit under an eÆcient allocation to be at least
min(s
i
). In particular, this implies that if the allocation were to be eÆcient, then a bidder
seeing a signal s
i
and having a value for one of their objects near min(s
i
) would expect
to have to bid near min(s
i
) to get an object.
The MLRP and continuity assumptions imply that min (s
i
) is continuous and non-
decreasing.
Next we assume that there is some possibility that at least somebody gets m objects.
(A5) In an eÆcient allocation, at least one type sees a positive probability of obtaining
m units. That is, min (s
i
) < v
m
(s
i
) for some s
i
.
(A5) is essentially without loss of generality, as otherwise we can reset m to simply
cover units that might be obtained.
Since min (s
i
) and v
m
(s
i
) are continuous, and min (s
i
) lies above v
m
(s
i
) at s
i
= 0 and
below v
m
(s
i
) for some s
i
under (A5), it follows that there exists s

so that min (s

) =
v
m
(s

) :
So s

identies a signal lets a bidder know that his or her valuation for an m-th object
is just on the border of sometimes versus never being awarded an object under an eÆcient
allocation. There could be many such signals, let us pick any one of them.
We assume that
(A6) min (v
m
(s

)) < min (s

), for some s

such that min (s

) = v
m
(s

) :
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While (A5) is fairly mild, (A6) has a bit more to it. (A6) requires that what an agent
sees as the lowest possible valuation getting an object in the limit in an eÆcient allocation
is increasing between v
m
(s

) and s

(or at least comparing the endpoints). This means
that signals convey some information about the support of the eÆcient cuto value v
n
,
at least in the limit.
The fact that signals convey information about the eÆcient cuto value is suÆcient
to ensure that agents who have the nearly the same valuation for one of their objects, but
hold dierent signals will bid substantially dierently in equilibrium. It is easily checked
that (A6) is satised in Example ??. While this condition is suÆcient to establish the
theorem below, it is not necessary for the result. The usefulness of the condition is that it
allows us to bound bidders' behavior, even in situations where we know very little about
the specic structure of the equilibrium.
Theorem ?? states that under the above assumptions, the discriminatory auction
always yields ineÆcient outcomes even in the limit.
Theorem 8 Under assumptions A1-A6 and m > 1, every sequence of equilibria of dis-
criminatory auctions fails to be asymptotically eÆcient.
The intuition behind the theorem is similar to he intuition we discussed above, and
was illustrated in Example ??. If the allocation were to be eÆcient, some of the marginal
bids would be coming from bidders who are bidding on their rst unit (with value s
i
),
while others would be coming from bidders who are bidding on their last unit (with value
v
m
(s
i
)). Under (A6), these two classes of bidders are both near the margin for an eÆcient
allocation, but have dierent beliefs about the cuto value. This provides for dierent
bidding behavior of the same valuations. The resulting bids are not monotonic in values
and the allocation fails to be eÆcient, even approximately and asymptotically.
Comparing Revenues in the Two Auctions
It is natural to conjecture that the asymptotic revenue for the discriminatory auction
would be no higher than that of the uniform price auction. The reason that this seems
natural is that the uniform price auction leads to an asymptotically eÆcient allocation
and the competitive price in the limit, while the discriminatory auction can lead to an
ineÆcient allocation. Hence, one might guess, that the discriminatory auction leads to a
correspondingly lower price. While this is true in some cases, it is not always true.
We begin with the case of single unit demands. Here it turns out that there is a
dierence between the auctions; but somewhat surprisingly, this is true even though
both auctions lead to the same eÆcient allocation.
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5.2 Comparing Revenues with Single-Unit Demands
A well-studied case in the literature (e.g., see Milgrom (1981)) is one where agents demand
only a single unit (m = 1).
Note that under (A4) there exist (symmetric) equilibria for both the uniform and
discriminatory auctions and that they support the same eÆcient allocation, where the
k
n
highest signal holders obtain the objects. The unique symmetric equilibrium strategy
in the uniform price auction is for bidders to use the dominant strategy of bidding their
value. An extension of the equilibrium of the rst price auction described in Milgrom
and Weber (1982) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in a multiple unit discriminatory
mechanism. The following theorem refers to that equilibrium, and the dominant strat-
egy equilibrium in the uniform price auction. We conjecture that these are the unique
equilibria, but do not have a proof of this.
17
Theorem 9 Let (A2) and (A4) and hold and
k
n
n
! b where 1 > b > 0. The uniform price
auction yields higher expected revenue per capita (and per-unit) than a discriminatory
price auction, by an amount that is bounded below as n!1.
We prove the theorem (in the appendix) using the following technique.
18
Using the
logic of Milgrom and Weber (1982), we can show that the expected payment of any given
signal holder in a uniform auction is at least that of his clone in a discriminatory auction.
We then argue that above a certain signal (one that is approximately sure to receive
an object for large n) the payment schedule for a discriminatory auction attens out,
as higher signal holders can always bid as if they had this lower signal and will still be
approximately certain to get an object. In the uniform auction, however, this payment
schedule does not atten out, as under strict MLRP observers of higher signals expect
higher market clearing prices. Through this we establish a bound on the dierence in
revenues.
While Theorem ?? shows that a uniform auction leads to higher expected revenues
than a discriminatory auction when each bidder demands at most one unit, this unam-
biguous ranking no longer holds when there are multiple-unit demands. With multiple-
unit demands the rankings can go either way.
To see that uniform auction revenues can exceed discriminatory auction revenues with
multiple-unit demands, consider a simple extension of the single-unit case, where bidders
value all of their objects at the same value. In that case, bidder behavior in the limit
17
These are the unique equilibria in the class of monotonic symmetric equilibria in which bidders
use pure strategies, but their overall uniqueness properties are more diÆcult to ascertain. In terms of
uniqueness, recall that the uncertain number of bidders rules out the standard asymmetric equilibria in
the uniform auction case.
18
This technique can also be used to establish a parallel result for the case of common values (see
Jackson and Kremer (2003), and in fact the result extends to situations where bidders' valuations
depend in monotone ways on both their signal and the common factor X .
17
looks similar to the single unit case, and so uniform auctions in that situation lead to
higher revenues than discriminatory auctions.
In contrast, in a situation where each bidder has a large dierence between marginal
valuations for some objects, then we saw in Example ?? that it is also possible for the
revenue of the discriminatory auction to exceed that of the uniform price auction.
These results suggest that there might be some relationship between the shape of
individual demand curves and the revenue rankings of the two auction formats. While
this seems to have some intuition behind it, we have not been able to discover any such
general result.
6 Conclusion
One might conjecture that in a competitive environment the particulars of the market
structure becomes largely irrelevant. We have shown that this conclusion is limited to
the case in which there is a vanishing number of objects for sale relative to the number of
bidders. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders,
the particulars of the auction format matter. While the eÆciency properties of some
prominent auction formats are unambiguous (but dierent), their relative revenue ranking
depends on the circumstances.
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8 Appendix
Details behind Example ??:
Let F
Y
n=2
jV
i
and f
Y
n=2
jV
i
denote the distribution and density functions of the median signal
conditional on V
i
. A similar argument to that of Milgrom and Weber (1982) shows that
a monotonic symmetric pure strategy equilibrium bidding function in the n-th economy,
b
n
, is the solution to the following dierential equation:
b
n0
(v
i
)F
Y
n=2
jv
i
(v
i
jv
i
) + b
n
(v
i
) f
Y
n=2
jv
i
(v
i
jv
i
) = s
i
f
Y
n=2
jv
i
(v
i
jv
i
) ;
which satises the boundary condition b
n
(0) = 0: This equation has a closed form solution
that implies b
n
(s
i
)! b (v
i
), where b (v
i
) satises the following equation for s
i
< 0:5.
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b
0
(v
i
)
v
i
1  v
i
+ b (v
i
)
2
1  v
i
= v
i
2
1  v
i
; (1)
and b
0
(v
i
) = 0 for v
i
> 0:5. Together with the boundary condition, b (0) = 0, this gives
us the claimed expression for b.
The asymptotic distribution of signals is uniform over [x=2; x]: Hence when averaging
over X we nd that the average revenue per unit converges to 0:215:
Proof of Theorem ??: Consider a xed supply of objects such that k
n
= k, and a
setting that satises assumptions A1-A3. We prove the claim by relying on the following
properties that are satised by both auctions:
 Both auctions award objects to the highest bids.
 In both auctions the price that a given bidder pays for a given unit is at least as
high as the highest non-winning bid of the other bidders, and does not exceed the
given bidder's bid for the given unit.
 In both auctions the price that a given bidder pays is non-decreasing in the vector
of own bids.
We argue that in any auction that satises the above properties all sequences of equilibria
lead to approximately eÆcient allocations and are such that the seller extracts the entire
surplus.
To see this let p
n
denote the lowest price paid for a unit in auction n. We prove the
theorem by showing that there is a vanishing probability that a bidder nds the lowest
equilibrium price, p
n
, to be signicantly lower than his value for the rst unit. In par-
ticular, we show that there is a sequence of fi
n
g such that for any Æ > 0 for n large
enough:
Pr (p
n
< S
i
n
  Æ)  Æ (2)
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Note that F
Y
n=2
jv
i
(tjt)! min[1;
t
1 t
]:
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This then implies the theorem since under A1, S
i
has a non-vanishing probability of being
within Æ=2 of S
max
, where S
max
is the highest observed signal. This implies full revenue
extraction as for any Æ
0
and large enough n Pr (p
n
< S
max
  Æ
0
)  Æ
0
. Also, it is easy
to check that given the private values setting (A2) and the structure of the auctions,
bidders never pay more than their value in equilibrium (as they would do better by
lowering their bids otherwise). Hence, we also get approximate eÆciency, as the objects
must be allocated to agents with valuations between S
max
  Æ
0
and S
max
, for arbitrary
Æ
0
.
So let us show (??) : Let "
n
converge to 0 more slowly than
k
n
n
; that is,
k
n
n"
n
! 0. Let A
n
i
denote the set of signals for which bidder i's conditional expected number of objects won
in the auction is less than "
n
. That is, letting q
i
be the random variable representing the
number of objects that bidder i obtains in the auction,
A
n
i
= fs
i
jE (q
i
jS
i
= s
i
) < "
n
g :
By the denition of A
n
i
, there must exist a sequence of fi
n
g for which P (S
i
n
2 A
n
i
n
)! 1,
as otherwise, the total number of objects expected to be received would exceed the total
supply (recalling that "
n
converges to zero at a slower rate than k
n
=n). For any i, let
B
 i
(k
n
) ; B
 i
(k
n
+ 1) denote the k
n
-th and k
n
+ 1-th highest bids among active bidders
other than i, respectively. Suppose that for some Æ
Pr (B
 i
n
(k
n
) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s) > Æ
for innitely many n and some s
n
i
2 A
n
i
n
for each of those n. In that case, for large enough
n, i
n
could deviate from the purported equilibrium strategy to strictly gain by bidding
s
n
i
  Æ, which would be a contradiction. Thus, for any Æ, for large enough n,
Pr (B
 i
n
(k
n
) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ (3)
for all s 2 A
n
i
n
. Lemma ?? shows that under noisy participation (A3) inequality (??)
implies that for any Æ; for large enough n
Pr (B
 i
n
(k
n
+ 1) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ (4)
for any s 2 A
n
i
n
. We also know from the structure of the auction that p
n
 B
 i
(k
n
+ 1)
for any i. Thus, it follows from (??) that for any Æ and large enough n
Pr (p
n
< s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ (5)
for all s 2 A
n
i
n
. Integrating (??) over s
i
n
2 A
n
i
n
implies that that for any Æ; P (p
n
< S
i
n
  Æ) 
2Æ, for large enough n, which implies the desired claim.
We now prove Lemma ??, which was referred to in the proof above.
Lemma 10 Under noisy participation (A3), and a xed number of units k
n
= k for sale,
if there exists fi
n
g such that for any Æ and for large enough n
P (B
 i
n
(k) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ (6)
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for any s 2 A
n
i
n
, then for any Æ and for large enough n
P (B
 i
n
(k + 1) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ
for any s 2 A
n
i
.
Proof of Lemma ??: Suppose the contrary. So, for any Æ and for large enough n
P (B
 i
(k) < s  ÆjS
i
n
= s)  Æ (7)
for any s 2 A
n
i
, while there exists Æ

such that for innitely many n
P (B
 i
(k + 1) < s
n
  Æ

jS
i
n
= s
n
) > Æ

(8)
for some s
n
2 A
n
i
.
For every bidder j 6= i
n
let Z
n
j
be the (random) number of bids that j 6= i
n
has above
s
n
 Æ; so Z
n
j
2 f0; 1; : : : ; mg. To account for how many bids by j 6= i
n
end up above s
n
 Æ
under the participation noise, (A3), we dene a new random variable which is equal to
Z
n
j
with probability (1  ) and equal to 0 with probability  . Let the resulting random
variables be denoted X
n
j
, which are independent (but not identically distributed).
In this notation, (??) and (??) (applying (??) at s
n
) become
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
< kjS
i
n
= s
n
1
A
 Æ (9)
and
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
< k + 1jS
i
n
= s
n
1
A
> Æ

(10)
When setting Æ =
Æ

2
and subtracting ??) from (??, it follows that
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
= kjS
i
n
= s
n
1
A
> Æ

=2 (11)
for innitely many n.
We get a contradiction by arguing that (??) implies that P

P
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
< kjS
i
n
= s
n

is
above some level for innitely many n.
To see this write,
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
= kjS
i
n
= s
n
1
A
=
X
z
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
= kjZ
 i
n
= z
1
A
P (Z
 i
n
= zjS
i
n
= s
n
) (12)
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Dene the set A
n
by
A
n
=
8
<
:
zjP
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
= kjZ
 i
= z
1
A
 Æ

=4
9
=
;
(13)
From (??) and (??), it follows that P (A
n
jS
i
n
= s
n
)  Æ

=4. Let N(z) be the number of
j's such that z
n
j
> 0. Note that P

P
j
X
n
j
= kjZ
 i
= z

goes to zero as N(z) gets large
(as it is bounded above by the probability of getting at most k 1's realized out of N(z)
Bernoulli random variables with a probability of (1  ) on each). Thus, there exists M
such that N(z) < M for all z 2 A
n
: However, this implies that for each z 2 A
n
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
< kjZ
 i
n
= z
1
A
 P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
= 0jZ
 i
n
= z
1
A
 
M
:
Since P (A
n
jS
i
n
= s

n
)  Æ

=4, we have shown that
P
0
@
X
j 6=i
n
X
n
j
< kjS
i
n
= s
n
1
A
 
M
Æ

=4
for innitely many n, which contradicts (??).
Proof of Lemma ??: We rst measure the inuence a bidder has on prices by looking
at the event in which he is able to push the price above some threshold y 2 [0; 1], given
that the price would be below y in the absence of the bidder's bids. Let Y
 i
(l) denote
the l-th highest bid excluding i's bids. Using this notation for bidder i to be able to push
the price above y it must be that Y
 i
(Q
n
 m) > y and Y
 i
(Q
n
) < y: Laws of large
numbers imply that this happens with low probability. Specically, the argument used
in Lemma 9.2 in Swinkels (2001) shows that for any " > 0 there exists some N
"
so that
n > N
"
implies that for any state X and bidder i:
Pr (Y
 i
(Q
n
 m) > y and Y
 i
(Q
n
) < yjX) < "
A sketch of the argument is as follows. There are (n  1)m bids of bidders besides i:
One can dene random variables fZ
j
g
(n 1)
j=1
that give the number of bids above y that are
submitted by bidder j. The probability that i pushes the price above y when starting
below is then bounded by pr

P
(n 1)
j=1
Z
j
2 [Q
n
 m;Q
n
]

: Conditional on X bids are
independent and hence so are the fZ
j
g : This implies that this probability is negligible
for large n since m is nite.
The above inequality implies that if we x a positive integer J , then for any j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg
there exists N
j
such that for n > N
j
Pr

Y
 i
(k
n
 m) >
j
J
and Y
 i
(k
n
) <
j
J
jX

<
1
J
2
:
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Letting N

= max
j
N
j
, it follows that for all n > N

Pr

9j : Y
 i
(k
n
 m) >
j
J
and Y
 i
(k
n
) <
j
J
jX

<
J
J
2
=
1
J
Let p
1
denote the price if bidder i submits the maximal possible bid on all of his units
and let p
0
denote the price if i bids zero on all of his units. The above inequality implies
that for any J there exists N
J
such that Pr

p
1
  p
0
>
2
J

<
1
J
for n > N
J
. To conclude
the proof let J = 2=":
Proof of Theorem ??: First, let us show that the price converges to the competitive
price. That is, for any Æ > 0, for all high enough n, Pr (jp
n
c
  p
n
j > Æ) < Æ.
Suppose that this is not the case, so that there exists Æ > 0 such that for all n (taking
a subsequence if necessary), Pr (p
n
c
  p
n
> Æ) > Æ. [The case where p
n
exceeds p
n
c
is
analogous.] Since both prices and values are bounded in [0; 1] there exists some Æ

> 0
and some a 2 [0; 1] such that for all n
20
Pr (p
n
< a and p
n
c
> a + Æ

) > Æ

:
Hence, for large enough n there is a probability bounded away from 0 that some bidder
who values a unit above a +
Æ

2
does not obtain that object and the price is less than
a. Consider a deviation for such bidders to bid truthfully instead. This increases the
expected number of units that such a bidder gets, but may also aect the clearing price.
However, by Lemma ?? the price implications for such a deviation are negligible for large
n. This yields a contradiction as it guarantees an extra unit at a prot bounded away
from zero for such a bidder for large enough n, with negligible price impact.
Next, note that a similar argument to that above (again invoking Lemma ??) implies
that although bidders may place some bids above or below their corresponding values in
equilibrium, this can only be in cases where for large enough n, changing those bids to
be equal to the corresponding values would have a negligible probability of aecting the
equilibrium allocation.
The approximate eÆciency follows from the convergence of price to the competitive one,
and bidders bidding as if they bid their values.
Proof of Theorem ??: The following lemma is useful.
Consider an n-bidder discriminatory auction. Let p
n
denote the minimal price paid in
equilibrium, i.e., the Q
n
 th highest bid, and let b
n
j
(s
i
) denote the bid in the n-th auction
for a j-th object by a bidder observing s
i
. Also, for any 1  j  m and Æ > 0 let
A
n
jÆ
=
n
s
i
jPr

v
j
(s
i
) > v
n
+ Æ and p
n
> b
n
j
(s
i
)

> Æ
o
20
Partition [0; 1] into 2=Æ intervals of size Æ=2 each, f[a
i
; a
i+1
]g
1=2Æ
i=1
. The case in which p
n
< p
n
c
  Æ
implies that we can nd some a
i
so that p
n
< a
i
and p
n
c
> a
i+1
: This implies that there exists some
interval for which Pr (p
n
< a
i
and p
n
c
> a
i+1
) > Æ
2
=2: Hence, we let Æ

= Æ
2
=2:
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Bn
jÆ
=
n
s
i
jPr

v
j
(s
i
) < v
n
  Æ and p
n
< b
n
j
(s
i
)

> Æ
o
:
Lemma 11 If for some j and Æ it is true that for any N there exists n > N such
that either Pr

A
n
jÆ

> Æ or Pr

B
n
jÆ

> Æ, then the discriminatory price auction is not
asymptotically eÆcient.
Proof of Lemma ??: Suppose that Pr

A
n
jÆ

> Æ for arbitrary large n; the case where
Pr

B
n
jÆ

> Æ is similar. Any signal that belongs to this set results in an eÆciency loss of
at least Æ
2
: The fact that Pr

A
n
jÆ

> Æ implies (appealing to the law of large numbers)
that there is an ex-ante eÆciency loss that is bounded away from zero when summing
across bidders.
Assume by contradiction that the outcome is asymptotically eÆcient.
First, let us argue that there exists Æ
1
such that b
n
1
(s
i
) < v
m
(s

)   Æ
1
for all signals
s
i
2 [v
m
(s

) ; v
m
(s

) + Æ
1
] for large enough n. Using the continuity of min (s) and as-
sumptions (A5)-(A6) we conclude that there exists an " such that agents with a signal
s
i
2 [v
m
(s

) ; v
m
(s

) + "] can expect to win their rst unit with a probability of at least
" by bidding v
m
(s

)   " for large enough n. This follows as prices never exceed v
n
: In
equilibrium, these bidders make an expected prot on their rst unit of at least "
2
and
hence they must be bidding below their value by at least "
2
: If we let Æ
1
= "
2
we get that
b
n
1
(s
i
) < v
m
(s

)  Æ
1
for all signals s
i
2 [v
m
(s

) ; v
m
(s

) + Æ
1
].
Next, note that there exists some Æ
2
> 0 so that s
i
2 [s

; s

+ Æ
2
] implies that b
n
m
(s
i
) >
v
m
(s

)   Æ
1
. This follows since bidders with signals close to (but above) s

have a low
but positive probability of winning their m  th object in an eÆcient allocation, but that
probability goes to zero in n if they underbid by any xed amount. As a result they bid
close to their reservation value on their m-th object for large n. Hence, there exists some
Æ
2
> 0 so that s
i
2 [s

; s

+ Æ
2
] implies that b
n
m
(s
i
) > v
m
(s

)  Æ
1
.
If we let Æ

= min (Æ
1
; Æ
2
) we conclude that agents with signal s
i
2 [v
m
(s

) ; v
m
(s

) + Æ
1
]
bid on their rst unit no more than v
m
(s

)  Æ

while agents with signal s
i
2 [s

; s

+ Æ

]
bid on their m  th unit at least this amount. Consider now the event that:
v
n
2 (v
m
(s

) + 2Æ

=5; v
m
(s

) + 3Æ

=5)
Since we assume that the distribution of signals has a full support, this event occurs with
some positive probability Æ

:
Consider two cases:
(i) p
n
 v
m
(s

)   Æ

: This event maps to A in Lemma ??. Bidders with types s
i
2
[v
m
(s

) + 4Æ

=5; v
m
(s

) + Æ

] are not awarded their rst object despite the fact that
their valuation exceeds the cuto by more than Æ

=5 .
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(ii) p
n
< v
m
(s

)   Æ

: This event maps to B in Lemma ??. Bidders with types s
i
2
[v
m
(s

) ; v
m
(s

) + Æ

=5] are awarded their m-th unit despite the fact that their valuation
is lower than the cuto by more than Æ

=5 .
Since either (i) or (ii) occurs with probability of at least Æ

=2 for large enough n, Lemma
?? implies a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem ??: Let t
n;d
(s
i
) ; t
n;u
(s
i
) be the expected payment (unconditional
on whether a bidder wins) of a bidder conditional on observing signal S
i
= s
i
, in the
discriminatory and the uniform price mechanisms respectively. The expected revenues
in the respective mechanisms are
n
Z
t
n;`
(s
i
) dF (s
i
) for ` = u; d: (14)
Given (A2) and (A4), an argument similar to that underlying Theorem 15 in Milgrom
and Weber (1982) implies that
t
n;u
(s
i
)  t
n;d
(s
i
) for every n and s
i
:
This implies that the expected revenue in the uniform price mechanism is no lower than
in the discriminatory one. However, it does not guarantee that there exists a positive
dierence that is bounded below as we increase the number of bidders. To show that
such gap exists, we argue that there is an interval in which t
n;d
(s
i
) becomes at as n
increases and that on the same interval, t
n;u
(s
i
) is increasing.
We identify the interval as follows. Let s

(x) be the solution to F (s
i
j x) = 1  b, where
recall
k
n
n
! b. Note that under (A4), s

(x) is increasing and continuous in x. Let the
interval be [s

; 1] ; where s

is the max of the support of the random variable s

(X). So,
in the limit in an eÆcient allocation, any value above s

should be getting an object,
regardless of the realization of X.
Let us rst show that t
n;d
(s
i
) becomes at as n increases on the interval [s

; 1]. Note that
s

< 1 since the distribution of S
i
conditional on X = 1 is described by a density function
and b < 1 and so 1 > s

(1)  s

. Also, since f(s
i
) > 0 for all s
i
, there is a positive
(unconditional) probability that S
i
2 [s

; 1]. For any s
i
2 (s

; 1], there is a large enough
n so that a bidder observing S
i
= s
i
has an arbitrarily high (prespecied) probability
of observing one of the highest k
n
signals. This implies that an agent who has a signal
s
i
> s

can pretend to have a lower signal with a minimal eect on the probability of
getting an object, for some large enough n. Hence, we conclude that for any s
i
> s
0
i
> s

t
n;d
(s
i
)  t
n;d
(s
0
i
)! 0: (15)
This implies that while t
n;d
(s
i
) is increasing in s
i
,
21
it converges to being at over the
interval (s

; 1] as n increases.
21
This follows from incentive compatibility, condition (A2), and the strict MLRP, condition (A4).
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We now complete the proof of the theorem by showing that indeed t
n;u
converges point-
wise on (s

; 1] to a function t

that is increasing over (s

; 1]. We rst note with private
values bidders bid their values. That is, a bidder who values the good at s
i
bids s
i
: This
implies that that the price is given by the k
n+1
highest signal. Hence, if s
i
> s

, since
agent i wins the auction with certainty it follows that:
t
n;u
(s
i
)! E (s

(X) jS
i
= s
i
) :
To see that indeed t

(s
i
) is increasing on (s

; 1] note rst s

(x) is increasing in x: More-
over, assumption (A4) implies that the distribution ofX conditional on S
i
= s
i
is stochas-
tically dominated by the distribution of X conditional on S
i
= s
0
i
, where s
0
i
> s
i
. The
result then follows from the stochastic dominance.
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